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    <title>Malware on 思安录 | Thinking&#39;s Security Notes</title>
    <link>https://blog.1sec.day/en-gb/tags/malware/</link>
    <description>Recent content in Malware on 思安录 | Thinking&#39;s Security Notes</description>
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    <language>en-gb</language>
    <managingEditor>Thinking</managingEditor>
    <webMaster>Thinking</webMaster>
    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 15 Jul 2026 00:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://blog.1sec.day/en-gb/tags/malware/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
    <item>
      <title>Telegram Desktop Local Session Reuse: a Reproduction That Should Not Have Happened</title>
      <link>https://blog.1sec.day/en-gb/posts/2026-07-15-telegram-desktop-local-session-reuse/</link>
      <pubDate>Wed, 15 Jul 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>Thinking</author>
      <guid>https://blog.1sec.day/en-gb/posts/2026-07-15-telegram-desktop-local-session-reuse/</guid>
      
      <description>&lt;blockquote&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The reproduction result exceeded what I understood to be possible. Telegram&amp;rsquo;s device authentication — phone verification, SMS code, 2FA password — seemed, to me, well-designed and complete. But when the tdata directory was copied to another Mac and the client launched, the login screen never appeared. This was not 2FA being cracked. The entire reuse path never entered a stage where credentials were requested.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/blockquote&gt;</description>
      
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>Trust Wallet Extension Backdoor: v2.68 Malicious Code Injection Analysis</title>
      <link>https://blog.1sec.day/en-gb/posts/2025-12-26-trust-wallet-extension-backdoor/</link>
      <pubDate>Fri, 26 Dec 2025 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>Thinking</author>
      <guid>https://blog.1sec.day/en-gb/posts/2025-12-26-trust-wallet-extension-backdoor/</guid>
      
      <description></description>
      
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2025-53770 SharePoint WebPart Injection Deserialization RCE: Active Exploitation Before Patch Day</title>
      <link>https://blog.1sec.day/en-gb/posts/2025-07-15-cve-2025-53770-sharepoint-rce/</link>
      <pubDate>Tue, 15 Jul 2025 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>Thinking</author>
      <guid>https://blog.1sec.day/en-gb/posts/2025-07-15-cve-2025-53770-sharepoint-rce/</guid>
      
      <description>&lt;p&gt;SharePoint treats WebPart rendering as &amp;ldquo;trusted internal&amp;rdquo;, but the ToolPane.aspx endpoint accepts unauthenticated POST — attackers construct a malicious WebPart payload that triggers a .NET deserialization gadget chain, executing arbitrary commands on the SharePoint Server without authentication, and Microsoft has confirmed it is being exploited in the wild.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>A Popular Solana Bot on GitHub Was a Wallet Thief: Supply Chain Attack Analysis</title>
      <link>https://blog.1sec.day/en-gb/posts/2025-07-03-solana-bot-supply-chain-attack/</link>
      <pubDate>Thu, 03 Jul 2025 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>Thinking</author>
      <guid>https://blog.1sec.day/en-gb/posts/2025-07-03-solana-bot-supply-chain-attack/</guid>
      
      <description></description>
      
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>Osiris Malicious Browser Extension Analysis: Download Link Hijacking Disguised as a Security Tool</title>
      <link>https://blog.1sec.day/en-gb/posts/2025-05-28-osiris-malicious-extension/</link>
      <pubDate>Wed, 28 May 2025 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>Thinking</author>
      <guid>https://blog.1sec.day/en-gb/posts/2025-05-28-osiris-malicious-extension/</guid>
      
      <description></description>
      
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2025-56386 Notepad&#43;&#43; DLL Hijacking: v8.8.3 DLL Search Order and CWD Fatal Combination</title>
      <link>https://blog.1sec.day/en-gb/posts/2025-04-15-cve-2025-56383-notepad-dll/</link>
      <pubDate>Tue, 15 Apr 2025 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>Thinking</author>
      <guid>https://blog.1sec.day/en-gb/posts/2025-04-15-cve-2025-56383-notepad-dll/</guid>
      
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Notepad++ uses Windows&amp;rsquo; default DLL search order (including CWD) when loading DLLs, but does not use &lt;code&gt;SetDefaultDllDirectories&lt;/code&gt; with &lt;code&gt;LOAD_LIBRARY_SEARCH&lt;/code&gt; to limit safe paths — attackers place a malicious same-named DLL in the CWD where the user opens a malicious document, and Notepad++ preferentially loads the CWD&amp;rsquo;s malicious DLL on startup, completing RCE under user privileges.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>LinkedIn Recruitment Phishing Analysis: A Targeted Attack Against Blockchain Engineers</title>
      <link>https://blog.1sec.day/en-gb/posts/2025-03-15-linkedin-recruitment-phishing/</link>
      <pubDate>Sat, 15 Mar 2025 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>Thinking</author>
      <guid>https://blog.1sec.day/en-gb/posts/2025-03-15-linkedin-recruitment-phishing/</guid>
      
      <description></description>
      
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2025-21756 Linux Kernel vsock UAF: Shortest Path from Socket Subsystem to Root</title>
      <link>https://blog.1sec.day/en-gb/posts/2025-02-28-cve-2025-21756-vsock-uaf/</link>
      <pubDate>Fri, 28 Feb 2025 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>Thinking</author>
      <guid>https://blog.1sec.day/en-gb/posts/2025-02-28-cve-2025-21756-vsock-uaf/</guid>
      
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Linux kernel&amp;rsquo;s vsock_diag_dump iterates AF_VSOCK sockets but the release order between the transport pointer (sk) and the vsock pointer (vsk) is misaligned — the attacker closes one side to leave the other dangling, and the next iteration lands on freed memory, escaping to the kernel control flow.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2025-11001 7-Zip ZIP Parsing Directory Traversal to RCE: Symlink Converging With the Extraction Path</title>
      <link>https://blog.1sec.day/en-gb/posts/2025-02-15-cve-2025-11001-7zip-traversal/</link>
      <pubDate>Sat, 15 Feb 2025 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>Thinking</author>
      <guid>https://blog.1sec.day/en-gb/posts/2025-02-15-cve-2025-11001-7zip-traversal/</guid>
      
      <description>&lt;p&gt;7-Zip treats symlink entries inside a ZIP as ordinary directory entries — the attacker crafts a three-layer structure of &amp;ldquo;directory + symlink + malicious file&amp;rdquo;, the symlink points to a sensitive system path, and when the victim extracts, the malicious file lands wherever the symlink points.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2025-21298 Windows OLE RCE: Plus-Offset Triggering Use-After-Free in CStdStubBuffer</title>
      <link>https://blog.1sec.day/en-gb/posts/2025-01-22-cve-2025-21298-ole-rce/</link>
      <pubDate>Wed, 22 Jan 2025 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>Thinking</author>
      <guid>https://blog.1sec.day/en-gb/posts/2025-01-22-cve-2025-21298-ole-rce/</guid>
      
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Windows OLE delegates object reference counting to ole32!CStdStubBuffer_Disconnect — the attacker crafts OLE references in an RTF document so the reference count jumps via plus-offset to a specific value, triggering premature object release; when the COPE framework later calls a virtual function on the freed object, the result is UAF.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>Fake Aggr Chrome Extension Crypto Theft Analysis: Cookie Stealing and Wash Trading</title>
      <link>https://blog.1sec.day/en-gb/posts/2024-05-31-aggr-malicious-chrome-extension/</link>
      <pubDate>Fri, 31 May 2024 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>Thinking</author>
      <guid>https://blog.1sec.day/en-gb/posts/2024-05-31-aggr-malicious-chrome-extension/</guid>
      
      <description></description>
      
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>node-serialize Deserialization RCE: An Underestimated Trust Chain in a Node.js Library</title>
      <link>https://blog.1sec.day/en-gb/posts/2024-01-15-node-serialize-rce/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 15 Jan 2024 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>Thinking</author>
      <guid>https://blog.1sec.day/en-gb/posts/2024-01-15-node-serialize-rce/</guid>
      
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The tiny serialization library &lt;code&gt;node-serialize&lt;/code&gt;, last released as 0.0.4, left one backdoor in its &lt;code&gt;unserialize()&lt;/code&gt; function — any JSON field whose value starts with &lt;code&gt;_$$ND_FUNC$$_&lt;/code&gt; is fed straight into &lt;code&gt;eval()&lt;/code&gt;. The result is arbitrary Node.js code execution.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2023-38831 WinRAR Spoof: 0-Click Attack via Archive File Masquerading</title>
      <link>https://blog.1sec.day/en-gb/posts/2023-08-23-cve-2023-38831-winrar-spoof/</link>
      <pubDate>Wed, 23 Aug 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>Thinking</author>
      <guid>https://blog.1sec.day/en-gb/posts/2023-08-23-cve-2023-38831-winrar-spoof/</guid>
      
      <description>&lt;p&gt;WinRAR&amp;rsquo;s extraction logic has a hidden behavior — when an archive contains both a &amp;ldquo;same-named directory&amp;rdquo; and a &amp;ldquo;same-named executable file,&amp;rdquo; WinRAR &lt;strong&gt;prefers to extract the executable file to the current directory and auto-execute it&lt;/strong&gt;. An attacker&amp;rsquo;s carefully crafted &amp;ldquo;looks-like-a-safe-image&amp;rdquo; turns out to be an executable.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2021-34527 PrintNightmare: A SYSTEM-Level DLL Loading Trap in Windows Print Spooler</title>
      <link>https://blog.1sec.day/en-gb/posts/2021-07-06-cve-2021-34527-printnightmare/</link>
      <pubDate>Tue, 06 Jul 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>Thinking</author>
      <guid>https://blog.1sec.day/en-gb/posts/2021-07-06-cve-2021-34527-printnightmare/</guid>
      
      <description>&lt;p&gt;A DLL-loading control gap in the Windows Print Spooler service — a single crafted SMB share is enough to coerce the system into loading an attacker-supplied driver DLL and handing the attacker SYSTEM-level command execution.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      
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